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NOTES
Copyrighting Newscasts: An Argu-
ment for an Open Market
INTRODUCTION
Is it proper to allow a number of small thefts, while prosecuting
only the larger takings? If the law against small misappropriations
cannot be enforced, should it be law at all? These questions arise
directly out of the application of the Copyright Act' to television
news broadcasts.
Copyright law is at once crystal clear and frustratingly vague.
This is primarily due to the wide range of materials given copy-
right protection. While in some cases copyright is straight forward,
a result of well written statutes and logical case law, other areas are
relatively new, and therefore tentative in definition. Also, there is
little case law for these new areas, requiring ill-fitting rules to be
drawn from ihe body of existing copyright law. Changes in tech-
nology have traditionally prompted revision in copyright law. The
current application of copyright law to news broadcasts demon-
strates the possibilities for ambiguities and presents a strong cause
for redefining the requirements for copyright protection.
The Eleventh Circuit pioneered the definition and application
of copyright law with regard to television news. This volatile area
of copyright seemed to be resolved by the circuit's decisions in
1984.2 However, in a recent interlocutory decision, the Eleventh
Circuit reversed its stand on the issue.? Although the decision that
created this situation was later vacated, the logic of the Eleventh
1. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1988 & Supp. I 1991).
2. Pacific & S. Co. v. Duncan, 572 F. Supp. 1186 (N.D. Ga. 1983), rev'd in part,
744 F.2d 1490 (1lth Cir. 1984), on remand, 618 F. Supp. 469 (N.D. Ga. 1985), affid, 792
F.2d 1013 (11th Cir. 1986).
3. CNN, Inc. v. Video Monitoring Servs. of Am., Inc., 940 F.2d 1471 (11th Cir.),
vacated, 949 F.2d 378 (11th Cir. 1991), appeal dismissed per curiam, 959 F.2d 188 (11th
Cir. 1992).
482 FORDHAM ENT., MEDIA & INTELL. PROP. L.F.
Circuit reopened the law of television copyrights to review, espe-
cially in the area of news coverage.
The Copyright Act of 1976 ("the 1976 Act") 4 defines publica-
tion as "the distribution of copies or phonorecords of a work to the
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or
lending."5 Specifically excluded from the definition of publication
are public performances or displays of a work, such as when the
work is broadcast or transmitted.6 This change made it possible for
television stations to defend against simultaneous recording or
rebroadcast by a competitor. The broadcaster is thus protected by
copyright; however, no legal action is possible until the work is
registered with the Register of Copyrights Accordingly, a work
cannot be registered until it is "fixed in any tangible medium of
expression." 8 This effectively prevents other stations from rebroad-
casting material from a primary station without permission. With
the development of improved technology and the concurrent rise of
easy-to-use video cassette recorders (VCRs), however, virtually
anyone with a VCR can now simultaneously record television
broadcasts.
The advent of the new technology also created a novel type of
video "news clipping" service. Like their print media predecessors,
these monitoring services provide the news of the day to interested
clients. Typically, a video clipping service constantly monitors all
newscasts. The service then contacts members of the public ap-
pearing in the newscasts and offers to sell them a tape of the rele-
vant segment. Alternatively, the service may have a standing order
with a client to provide automatically copies of segments in which
the client is interested. Many of these services also provide news
synopses or news in a digested form, tailored to fit a client's needs.
4. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810.
5. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
6. Id.
7. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (1988).
8. 17 U.S.C. §102(a) (1988). The 1976 Act requires that a fixed work be "sufficient-
ly permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicat-
ed for a period of more than transitory duration." Live broadcasts are deemed "fixed" if
they are fixed simultaneously with their transmission. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
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Herein lies the infringement conflict. Stations produce and
copyright newscasts, but members of the public are able to record
them at virtually no cost. The recorded copies are then sold at a
profit, with no hint of royalties to the station. The problem with
prosecuting this type of infringement is that the typical offense is
small, in the $40-$100 range.9 However, the recent incorporation
of the Berne Convention into United States copyright law allows
punitive damages of up to $20,000 for each offense.10 This seems
overly harsh. The alternative is to obtain an injunction preventing
any recording, but this too can be overly restrictive.
This Note discusses the conflict and offers possible resolutions.
Part I will give a brief overview of copyright law as it relates to
television and, specifically, to newscasts. Part II will summarize
the current positions of the courts on this issue through analysis of
the two major cases involved in this question, Pacific & Southern
Co. v. Duncan1 and CNN, Inc. v. Video Monitoring Services of
America, Inc. 2 Part IR will demonstrate why the commonly ap-
plied "fair use" doctrine of balancing regulatory interests against
proprietary interests is of little help in providing a remedy in these
sorts of cases. Part IV will argue for placing news broadcasts
outside of copyright protection altogether and present a new ap-
proach to protecting such material by taking into account the eco-
nomic and social realities of the situation.13
I. THE LAW-PAST AND PRESENT
Copyright is at once a constitutional right and a legal necessity.
9. See, e.g., Pacific & S. Co. v. Duncan, 572 F. Supp. 1186, 1189 (N.D. Ga. 1983);
Cable News Network, Inc. v. Video Monitoring Services of America, Inc., 940 F.2d 1471,
1474 (11th Cir. 1991).
10. 17 U.S.C.A. § 504(c)(1) (Supp. 1992).
11. 572 F. Supp. 1186 (N.D. Ga. 1983), rev'd in part, 744 F.2d 1490 (11th Cir.
1984).
12. 940 F.2d 1473 (l1th Cir. 1991).
13. For an earlier treatment of the question of news broadcasts and copyright, see
Joan C. Steiger, Note, Copyright Law-Videotaping Live Television News Broadcasts For
Commercial Purposes WXIA-TV v. Duncan, 8 MED. L. REP. (BNA) 2075 (N.D. Ga. June
28, 1982), 6 W. NEv ENG. L. REv. 225 (1983).
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The Constitution grants Congress the power to enact copyright
law.' 4 Congress, in turn, has enacted copyright law and has taken
the responsibility of clarifying it from time to time.
A. The Origin of Copyright
The origin of copyright law is couched in English equity and
statutory law.15 The Statute of Anne was passed by Parliament in
1710 in response to the iron-fisted censorship of the Licensing Act
of 1662.16 The Statute attempted to wrest control of the publishing
industry from the Crown-controlled Stationers and place more pow-
er in the authors of works. 7
The United States originally passed legislation on copyright law
in 1790, granting copyrights only to authors of maps, charts, and
books.18 However, as society advanced and new forms of commu-
nication and media developed, copyright case law grew as well.
With the advent of the first mechanical recording devices, such as
the phonograph and motion pictures, copyright law expanded to
include recorded works of music or voice.' 9 With the birth of the
radio, television, and home recording devices, the law expanded yet
further.20  Finally in 1976, the law was completely overhauled,
taking into account live broadcasts and the various forms of fixa-
tion.
For a work to be copyrighted, it must be original and in a fixed
form.21 The originality requirement limits the copyrightability of
14. "The Congress shall have Power... [t]o promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
15. Stephen S. Zimmerman, Comment, A Regulatory Theory of Copyright: Avoiding
a First Amendment Conflict, 35 EMORY L.J. 163, 171 (1986).
16. Id. at 176.
17. Id.
18. H.R. REP. No. 1476,94th Cong., 2d Sess. 51-52, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659, 5664-65.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 53, 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5666.
21. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1988 & West Supp. 1992). Section 102 reads as follows:
(a) Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works
of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later
developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise commu-
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a factual work, such as an encyclopedia or news broadcast. Only
its presentation or form may be copyrighted. Neither ideas nor
facts may be copyrighted, regardless of their novelty. Theoretical-
ly, copyright law promotes the free flow of ideas and information,
while providing incentive to authors to be productive. Without
copyright, there would be little or no incentive for an author to
produce an original work, to put the time, thought and effort into
a new creation.
First, the original author would suffer. As soon as the new
work was put on sale, any free rider22 could immediately copy the
work and sell it at a great profit-a greater profit, perhaps, than
even the creator of the work. Despite the author's time and labor,
his hard-earned profits would be going to the free rider.
Second, society at large would suffer. It would pay to be a
scavenger instead of an originator. Much less effort has to be
invested in order to feed off another's work. With no copyright
law, there would be a great number of imitators, and little incentive
to create original works.
On the other hand, it is possible to extend copyright protection
too far. Suppose, for example, that copyright was absolute. That
is, all works belong to the author regardless of their nature and
without time limit. If an author were able to copyright facts or
ideas, the consequences would border on the absurd. Authors of
nicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. Works of au-
thorship include the following categories: (I) literary works; (2) musical works,
including any accompanying words; (3) dramatic works, including any accom-
panying music; (4) pantomimes and choreographic works; (5) pictorial, graphic,
and sculptural works; (6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; (7)
sound recordings; and (8) architectural works. (b) In no case does copyright
protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure,
process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regard-
less of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in
such work.
Id.
22. An "economic free rider" is a person who profits from the works of others with
little or no extra work. The term comes from a classic economics example. Picture a
bus. As long as the bus is full of paying passengers, the driver is happy, and may allow
one passenger to ride for free. However, when everyone wants to be a free rider, no one
pays the driver, and the bus goes nowhere.
1993]
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history books would be able to claim rights against any later histo-
ry books that repeated the same facts. Newton could have copy-
righted his laws in perpetuity, thus being able to claim rights
against anyone who used his principles in later theories or scientific
journals. Today's copyright law not only regulates those who
would use works, but also those who create them.23 Picture a see-
saw: on one side, those who create works, and on the other, those
who would use them. Copyright is given the task of promoting
both sides, without favoring one over the other-a delicate balanc-
ing act indeed.
Copyright law was simpler when fewer categories of copyright-
able materials existed. Generally, if something could be written
down, it could be. copyrighted (aside from the aforementioned fac-
tual exceptions).2" At the turn of the century, however, a number
of decisions made copyrightability dependent on the type of medi-
um in which the work was fixed.O These cases created a system
of artificial categories to determine the copyrightability of certain
works.26 That is, while some works were obviously reproduced,
the method of reproduction was not addressed in the then-current
copyright law. The works were thus deemed unprotected by copy-
right. This in turn created a highly inequitable system. Congress
remedied the situation in 1909 by adding the fixation requirement
to the copyright law2 Instead of depending on the form of the
medium, copyright law was made to depend on the permanence or
23. See generally, L. Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use, 40
VAND. L. REV. 1, 8-12 (1987) [hereinafter Patterson, Free Speech].
24. For examples of non-copyrightable subject matter, see 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (exam-
pies of non-copyrightable subject matter) (reproduced supra note 21).
25. See, e.g., White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
This case dealt with the perforated music rolls for player pianos. Makers of player pianos
also sold perforated rolls of paper, which, when inserted in the player piano mechanism,
caused the piano to play particular tunes. The owner of the copyright on the music
claimed infringement; the court decided that since the rolls were only holes punched in
paper, and could not be read by eye, no copyright protection existed. Id. at 18; see also
Stem v. Rosey, 17 App. D.C. 562 (1901).
26. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 18, at 52, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 5665.
27. Id.
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stability of the fixation.= By encompassing works "fixed in any
tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed,"29
the new law included original works that were in non-traditional
formats.
B. Copyright and Television
The development of live television brought a plethora of new
problems. In the early years of live television, only television
studios had the capability of recording shows, so there was no
possible copyright infringement issue. Studios eventually acquired
technology, however, that allowed them to record programs elec-
tronically onto video tape. This also enabled the studios to record
broadcasts other than their own, and then the difficulties arose.
The main issue was not whether a program was copyrightable.
For the most part, live television programs were treated like motion
pictures. The true problem was that of fixation.
Logically, copyrightable materials must be in a tangible form,
or "fixed" in some manner.30 Without this requirement, proving
copyright infringement would be impossible and cases would con-
sist entirely of hearsay and dubious evidence. Typically, copy-
right protection goes to the first person to "fix" and register an
original work. However, fixation of live broadcasts can be made
simultaneously by all those recording the show, including home
viewers. The solution was to recognize statutorily that fixation
occurred in the originating studio simultaneously with transmission
of the broadcast.3'
II. THE PROBLEMS AND CASES
A. Dealing with Videotaping Generally
If television broadcasting is copyrighted, how is it that record-
ing devices are permitted outside of the originating studios? In-
28. 17 U.S.C. § 102.
29. Id.
30. Id. § 102(a).
31. Id. § 101 (definition of "fixed"). See supra note 8.
19931
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deed, why is the general public allowed to make copies of broad-
casts at all? These questions were answered by the United States
Supreme Court in the Betamax case.32
Sony developed the Betamax, a video tape recorder that enabled
the general public to videotape programs off the air. Universal
Studios ("Universal") claimed that some people had used the
Betamax to record a number of Universal's copyrighted works.
Universal further claimed that Sony was liable because it had pro-
duced the Betamax machine knowing that it would be used for
copyright infringement. The Ninth Circuit ruled against Sony,
holding that off-the-air home videotaping of copyrighted television
shows, despite its non-commercial and private nature, constituted
infringement.
33
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the question was not
whether the Betamax could be used to infringe copyrights, but
whether it could be used for significant, non-infringing purposes. 4
The Court reached three conclusions. First, the primary use of
videotaping was for "time-shifting," that is, recording a program so
that it could be watched-later. The Court found that because time
shifting actually enlarged the audience for a specific television
show, the broadcaster had no reason to complain.3 5 Second, Uni-
versal was "unable to prove that the practice [of videotaping trans-
missions for home use] ha[d] impaired the commercial value of
their copyrights or ha[d] created any likelihood of future harm. 36
Third, allowing home videotaping was "consistent with the First
Amendment policy of providing the fullest possible access to infor-
32. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). For an
in-depth treatment of the Betamax decision, and its effect on home video taping, see Joni
Lupovitz, Beyond Betamax and Broadcast: Home Recording from Pay Television and the
Fair Use Doctrine, 2 FORDHAM ENT., MEDIA & INTELL. PROP. L.F. 69 (1992).
33. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963, 969 (9th Cir.
1981), rev'd, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
34. 464 U.S. at 442.
35. Id. at 421.
36. Id. However, Justice Blackmun took an entirely different approach in his vigor-
ous dissent, stating that "a copyright owner need prove only a potential for harm to the
market for or the value of the copyrighted work." Id. at 482 (citing 3 MELVRILE B.
NviMER & DAvID NMVMR, N IMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05(E)(4)(c), at 13-84 (1983)).
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mation through the public airwaves. s37
The Betamax decision was the end result of a chain of video-
taping cases, beginning with Walt Disney Productions v. Alaska
Television Network,38 which held that videotaping copyrighted en-
tertainment broadcasts for later retransmission by a cable operator
was an infringing action. A later case, Encyclopedia Britannica
Educational Corp. v. Crooks,39 held that although videotaping edu-
cational programming for educational purposes by a school district
could be fair use, there must also be an element of spontaneity.
Therefore, systematic recording of such programming was consid-
ered infringement.40
B. Moving on to the News
1. A Blow for Free Markets
Precedents in the narrow field of copyrighting newscasts are
sparse, consisting of only two cases. Nevertheless, these cases are
invaluable in pointing out the basic conflicts in this area. The first
decision in this chain is Pacific & Southern Co. v. Duncan
("Duncan r'" Ms. Duncan was the operator of TV News Clips,
a self-styled news clipping service.42 Her business consisted of
recording segments of local newscasts, and then contacting the
person who was the subject of a particular segment. She would
sell a copy of the recorded segment to the featured person for a fee
of $65 and $25 for additional copies.43 In this particular case,
Pacific & Southern, doing business as WXIA-TV, produced a seg-
37. Id. at 425 (quoting Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F.
Supp. 429, 454 (C.D. Ca. 1979)). The district court referred to the holding in CBS, Inc.
v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 102, in which the Supreme Court held that
Jesse Jackson's keynote speech at the 1976 Democratic National Convention was not
protected by copyright.
38. 310 F. Supp. 1073, 1075 (W.D. Wash. 1969).
39. 542 F. Supp. 1156 (W.D.N.Y. 1982).
40. Id. at 1175.
41. 572 F. Supp. 1186 (N.D. Ga. 1983), affd in part, rev'd in part, 744 F.2d 1490
(llth Cir. 1984).
42. 572 F. Supp. at 1189.
43. Id.
1993]
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ment about a new jogging trail at a local junior college. Ms.
Duncan recorded the segment and sold it to the college. 4 WXJA-
TV duly registered the segment and the newscast and brought an
action for copyright infringement against Ms. Duncan.45
Ms. Duncan pleaded two defenses. First, she claimed that
copyright protection for newscasts violated the First Amendment,
as it restricted the free flow of information4 6 Newscasts, she ar-
gued, were unique in that they were not truly fixed, and the station
was under no duty to preserve them in a permanent form or to
make copies readily available.4 7 By performing this activity pri-
vately, Ms. Duncan claimed that she was in fact advancing the
basic purpose of the First Amendment. She argued that prohibiting
copying would "be tantamount to sanctioning monopolization of
information.v4
8
This argument was summarily rejected by the district court as
irrelevant. The court found that while the factual basis of news
cannot be copyrighted, the method of expression may be.4 9 It de-
termined that the idea-expression line was distinct in this case, and
that the news covered was "soft," and thus not representative of an
overriding First Amendment interest.50 Finally, the court recog-
nized that to date, most issues of this nature had been resolved by
application of the "fair use doctrine," and that no circuit had recog-
nized a First Amendment exception to copyright.5'
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1192.
47. Id. WXIA-TV kept a tape of the entire broadcast for one week and then de-
stroyed it. However, the station kept tapes of individual news items for indefinite periods.
The station also kept complete written transcripts of each of its newscasts, as well as the
scripts. WXIA-TV also offered taped copies of its newscasts for sale to the general
public, but at the somewhat higher price of $100 per tape. Id. at 1190-91.
48. Id. at 1192.
49. Id. at 1193.
50. Id.
51. Id. The reasoning is that copyrightable works are "carved out" of works protect-
ed by the First Amendment. Fair use is an exception to copyright, not an expansion of
copyright. The Supreme Court treated this question in a perfunctory manner. See Harper
& Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985).
[Vol. 3:481
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The court also rejected Ms. Duncan's second argument that her
recording of the newscasts constituted fair use. 2 When deciding
fair use, a court must apply a four-part test, laid out in § 107 of the
Copyright Act.53 However, the court never reached this test. It
decided that Ms. Duncan failed to meet the preliminary require-
ments of the section, specifically, whether the use was clearly for
purposes such as "criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching.
. scholarship, or research." 54 The court thought (and indeed, Ms.
Duncan admitted) that the purpose was strictly commercial and did
not satisfy any of these initial requirements.
5 5
Consequently, Ms. Duncan lost the case. However, the court
assessed the damages at only $35, the amount she received for the
sale of the clip. The court stated that any further punishment
would not serve the aims of copyright.5 6  The punishment was
extraordinary in its mildness. The court pointedly refused to exer-
cise its options of fining Ms. Duncan up to $10,000, enjoining her
from further monitoring, and awarding attorney's fees to WXIA-
TV. The district court denied the injunction for three reasons: (1)
the sales did not seriously threaten WXIA-TV's creativity, so an
injunction would not further the aims of copyright law; (2) an in-
junction could threaten the First Amendment value of the tapes that
52. Duncan I, 572 F. Supp. at 1195.
53. The section reads as follows:
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a
copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords
or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom
use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determin-
ing whether the use made of a work in any particular ease is a fair use the
factors to be considered shall include- (1) the purpose and character of the
use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit
educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount
and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a
whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of
the copyrighted work.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988 & Supp. III 1991) (emphasis added).
54. Duncan 1, 572 F. Supp. at 1195 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 107).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1196-98.
57. Id. at 1197.
19931
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Ms. Duncan made available to the public; and (3) since WXIA-TV
had abandoned its copyright on several portions of the newscasts,
a decree fair to both parties distinguishing between abandoned and
unabandoned portions would be too difficult to formulate.58 This
simple act by the district court demonstrated its reluctance to pun-
ish Ms. Duncan for something that, although technically illegal, did
not offend its sensibilities.
WXIA-TV's damage was de minimis. True, it did offer to sell
tapes of broadcasts itself, but at the greatly inflated price of $100
per tape. It was not actively marketing its tapes, nor did it project
any revenue from the sale of such recordings. 9 Ms. Duncan, on
the other hand, embodied the American spirit of free enterprise,
and, taking something that was relatively worthless, turned it into
a commodity and a full-time business. One can understand why
the court was reluctant to punish Ms. Duncan for her actions.
While the court reasoned that greater punishment would serve no
good end, its underlying message was that the wrong done to
WXIA-TV was so small that enforcing an injunction against Ms.
Duncan would be inequitable.
2. Turnabout Is Fair Play
The Eleventh Circuit did not agree with the district court. 6 On
appeal ("Duncan I Appeal"), the circuit court agreed that Ms.
Duncan was guilty of copyright infringement, but found the remedy
granted to WXIA-TV was incomplete.6
There is an interesting aside to the circuit court's initial review
of Duncan L In a brief statement in dictum, the court summarily
declined to treat TV News Clips as a newspaper clipping service
because it did not purchase the same copy that it sold to its cli-
ents.62
58. Id. at 1196.
59. Id. at 1198.
60. Pacific & S. Co. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490 (11th Cir. 1984).
61. Id. at 1500.
62. Id. at 1494 n.6. This reasoning is based on the Eleventh Circuit's interpretation
of § 109 of the Copyright Act, which allows the owner of a copy to dispose of it by any
[Vol. 3:481
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The circuit court thought it was improper for the district court
not to consider the four-part test of § 107.63 However, in consid-
ering the question itself, the circuit court found no evidence of fair
use, and it therefore upheld the judgment.6 The circuit court also
rejected Ms. Duncan's claim of First Amendment rights because
although WXLA-TV wished to restrict the use of its broadcasting,
it did not make tapes inaccessible to the public. 5 Anyone attempt-
ing to purchase the tapes simply had to take a more difficult (and
costly) route. Ms. Duncan was not the only supplier of the service.
The circuit court applied the following reasoning. WX[A-TV
had been granted copyright. There were only two ways to enforce
the copyright. The first was to find out which programs had been
copied, to register the programs, and then to take legal action. In
this case, each suit would amount only to a very small award; so,
the cost of bringing the lawsuits would have been prohibitive. The
second option was to obtain an injunction prohibiting TV News
Clips from copying any WXLA-TV material for resale, an act that
is for the most part illegal anyway.66 The circuit court found that
the district court's reasons for refusing the injunction were legally
insufficient and held that the district court abused its power in not
granting an injunction.67
The district court stated that the precise wording of an appropri-
ately limited injunction against Ms. Duncan was not apparent. The
Eleventh Circuit, however, found that an injunction was the only
correct remedy for the established legal rights, despite the difficulty
in formulating it.68 After the case went back to the district court
on remand, the Eleventh Circuit reaffirmed the applicability of the
means, including sale. This is commonly referred to as the "first sale doctrine." 17
U.S.C. § 109 (1988 & Supp. 1 1991). The circuit court refused even to consider the
point that Ms. Duncan might actually be the legal owner of the videotaped copy. This
will be discussed infra at Part IV.A.1.
63. Duncan I Appeal, 744 F.2d at 1495.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1498.
66. 17 U.S.C. § 502 (1988) (court may "prevent or restrain infringement of copy-
right").
67. Duncan I Appeal, 744 F.2d at 1499, 1500.
68. Id. at 1500.
19931
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injunction.69
There is a fundamental tension underlying the Eleventh Cir-
cuit's decision to grant the injunction against Ms. Duncan. Such
an injunction directly contradicts the copyright goal of promoting
distribution of information. Granting it has the effect of prohibiting
the copying of works that do not yet exist. Supposing that Ms.
Duncan is the only person currently capable of such infringement,
the injunction has the further effect of doing away with the need
to register the works before an action can be brought. While it is
true that a cause of action exists before a work is registered, an
infringer cannot be punished until the work is registered. An in-
junction like the one above bypasses this safeguard. The remedy
would then lie in common law, i.e., contempt, and not in copyright.
At common law, the copyrightability of a work is assumed, obviat-
ing the need to register or even produce original works.
3. Free Market Returns
The next case in the video clipping chain is that of CNN v.
Video Monitoring Services of America, Inc.7" Video Monitoring
Services ("VMS") performed essentially the same function as Ms.
Duncan's TV News Clips, except on a national scale. VMS moni-
tored newscasts nationally and then sold recordings of certain por-
tions to third parties.7'
In the course of this business, VMS continuously taped the
programming of plaintiff Cable News Network ("CNN") twenty-
four hours a day, seven days a week.72 In 1988, VMS sales of
CNN broadcasts numbered 2,502 transactions, bringing in approxi-
mately $300,00. 3 VMS was not licensed by CNN to perform this
job; indeed, CNN contracted with Radio TV Reports, a VMS com-
petitor, to supply all requested news clips.74 Additionally, CNN
69. Pacific & S. Co. v. Duncan, 792 F.2d 1013 (llth Cir. 1986) ("Duncan If').
70. 940 F.2d 1471 (11th Cir. 1991).
71. Id. at 1474.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
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had a number of "in-house" recording operations that provided
tapes of broadcasts for educational and other purposes.'5
Obviously, not all of CNN's broadcasts were live. Pre-recorded
portions included commercials and videotapes of newsworthy
events that had recently occurred.76 These segments were often
closely interspersed with live broadcasting. 7 In the case of video-
taped news, there was sometimes a live voice-over explaining the
situation and providing additional facts.78 Other portions were
entirely pre-recorded with no live element at all. These included
"human interest" pieces that did not require constant updating, and
special affairs shows, such as the "Crossfire" segment which was
the basis for the instant case.79
CNN learned that VMS made and sold unlicensed copies of
CNN broadcasts. Several times, counsel for CNN orally requested
VMS to stop copying CNN transmissions." VMS continued the
taping. On March 12, 1985, CNN sent VMS a letter instructing it
to discontinue taping CNN broadcasts.81 VMS responded that it
relied on videotaping as part of its monitoring process and that
individually monitoring each newscast "would be physically and
economically impossible." s2 When VMS declined to cease opera-
tion, CNN filed a four-count complaint.
83
75. See id. at 1473. CNN's transmissions consist not only of news but of a number
of special programs as well. These programs include forums for public debate, such as
"Crossfire," as well as talk shows, like "Larry King Live." When CNN transmits, two
tapes are made of the broadcast. The first is made by a production assistant and is erased
after one week. The second is made by the engineering department and is retained for
three and a half years. It is then erased. Some specific programs, however, have multiple
recordings made. "Crossfire' and "Larry King Live" are in this category. These addi-
tional tapes are kept for one year, but certain selected segments have-no termination date.
Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1473-74.
79. Id. at 1474.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1475 & 1476 n.6. CNN claimed ownership of the copyright in the October
17, 1988, edition of "Crossfire' ("the Segment"). Id. at 1474. CNN claimed that VMS
had copied the Segment and sold the copy. Id. CNN produced as evidence of the copy-
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This Note is concerned with the count claiming infringement of
copyright. CNN filed a request for a preliminary injunction enjoin-
ing VMS from future taping of all CNN transmissions, as per the
1984 ruling of Duncan I Appeal. The district court granted this
motion, enjoining VMS "from copying or selling copies of any of
[plaintiff's] programming., ' s4
VMS then filed a motion on February 21, 1990, to clarify and
amend the judgment. VMS claimed that the language of the in-
junction was improper and overly broad because it prohibited far
more activity than would allegedly infringe CNN's copyrights. s
The district court denied VMS's motion to clarify the order, which
the court felt was nothing more than a thinly veiled attempt to
delay the judicial process.16 Thereafter, VMS filed an appeal of the
injunctive order to the Eleventh Circuit.87
The Eleventh Circuit reviewed the precedent set by the holding
in Duncan 11.88 CNN was convinced that the cases were similar
enough to be treated in the same fashion. However, the circuit
court drew a distinction between the two cases.8 9 Although both
cases dealt with the issue of unauthorized use of copyrighted news-
casts, the court in Duncan II specifically declined to address the
issue of providing "news summaries," instead of the actual tapes,
to clients. 90 Unlike the Duncan II injunction, which prohibited TV
News Clips from recording broadcasts for resale, the order request-
ed by CNN prohibited all unauthorized recording, whether for re-
right its certificate of registration of the Segment, which classified the program as a"mo-
tion picture' (conforming to 17 U.S.C. § 101) and a "work made for hire," making the
station the author of the work. Id. at 1475.
The complaint against VMS consisted of four counts: unauthorized publication or use
of communications, deceptive trade practices, common law unfair competition, and misap-
propriation. Id. at 1475 & 1476 n.6.
84. Id. at 1476. The injunction became effective on the condition that CNN post an
$80,000 bond securing against the possibility that it would lose the case. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1476-77 (citing Pacific & S. Co. v. Duncan, 792 F.2d 1013 (11th Cir.
1986)).
89. Id.
90. Id. (citing Duncan II at 1015).
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sale or merely "monitoring."91
Accordingly, the circuit court found that the scopes of the two
injunctions were significantly different, and thus it declined simply
to apply the Duncan 11 standard.92 Moreover, the circuit court felt
that the recent Supreme Court decision in Feist Publications, Inc.
v. Rural Telephone Services Co.93 significantly changed the applica-
tion of copyright law, mandating a close review of decisions prior
to the Supreme Court's ruling.94
The circuit court in VMS first evaluated the requirement of
jurisdiction in the case.95 For a court to have jurisdiction in a mat-
ter, the § 411 registration requirement of the Copyright Act must
be met.96
The court then determined that the scope of the remedy for
copyright infringement was constrained and dictated by the scope
of what was actually registered for copyright. 97 Here, only a thirty-
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. 111 S. Ct. 1282 (1991). The defendant in Feist published a competing telephone
directory, copying telephone numbers from plaintiff's directory. The Supreme Court ruled
that there was no copyright infringement because telephone numbers are entirely factual,
and therefore not under copyright protection. The Supreme Court also rejected the "sweat
of the brow" theory that some property right had been engendered by plaintiff's work in
compiling the phone numbers. Id. This is in direct opposition to the Supreme Court's
holding in International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918), which
recognized that industrious news-gathering created at least a limited "quasi-property"
right.
94. VMS, 940 F.2d at 1477. The circuit court applied a four-part test to determine
the validity of the preliminary injunction. CNN had to prove: (1) a substantial likelihood
of success on the merits; (2) a substantial threat of irreparable injury; (3) that its own
injury outweighed the injury to VMS; and (4) the injunction would not disserve the public
interest. Id. at 1477-78 (citing Tally-Ho, Inc. v. Coast Community College Dist., 889
F.2d 1018, 1022 (11th Cir. 1990)).
95. 940 F.2d at 1480.
96. Id. The requirement is that "no action for infringement of copyright in any work
shall be instituted until registration of the copyright claim has been made in accordance
with this title." 17 U.S.C. § 411(a).
97. 940 F.2d at 1480. The court recognized the conflict that could result from
overzealous application of § 502 of the 1976 Act, which allows injunctions as remedies.
See supra note 66. As discussed supra in Part H.B.2, by enjoining a person from copying
a work not yet in existence, let alone registered, the court would obviate the need for
registration in the first place. Hence, the court stood by the axiom that a remedy should
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minute segment had been registered. In addition, the segment was
not representative of CNN's normal broadcasting; that is, the bulk
of CNN's broadcasting was of live news coverage, while the al-
leged infringement had occurred regarding a non-news "specialty
show."98
CNN asked for an injunction preventing all recording. The
court found this to be the equivalent of claiming a remedy avail-
able for (1) unregistered claims of copyright in unpublished works,
and (2) putative copyrights in works that are not yet in existence.99
The court considered both of these theories direct contradictions to
copyright law. The VMS decision requires further analysis.
a. The Future Works Issue
The main problem with protecting "putative copyrights which
are not yet in existence," as the circuit court saw it, was that it was
impossible for a non-existent work to be "fixed." Fixation is inte-
gral to copyright law; indeed, no copyright can exist without it.10°
Until there is a copyright, there cannot be a copyright owner. The
law restricts actions for infring6ment of copyright to the owner of
the infringed copyright.101 Assuming ownership, no action can be
made for recovery until the copyright is registered. The court then
recognized that an argument existed for some sort of equitable
protection of the author's efforts. It would seem unjust for one
person to work diligently in producing a work, and, at the last
moment, (or after the fact) to allow a second party to acquire the
work with no recompense. However, the circuit court found this
theory to be in direct conflict with the recent Supreme Court deci-
sion in Feist.'02 CNN did not claim to own the news. On the
other hand, CNN did claim that newscasts should be protected in
only correct the fault complained of (which was in this case infringement of a single half-
hour segment).
98. VMS, 940 F.2d at 1480.
99. Id.
100. See 17 U.S.C. § 102.
101. VMS, 940 F.2d at 1481 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 501(b)(1988)).
102. Id.
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some way because of the effort made to collect and compile the
news. 3 Yet, the Feist decision expressly rejected this "sweat of
the brow" theory.1 4 The Supreme Court emphasized that the tell-
ing factor in copyright is originality, not amount of effort exert-
ed.105 Hence, "[t]he primary objective of copyright is not to reward
labor of 'authors, but... 'to promote the Progress of Science and
the useful Arts.""' 6 Accordingly, the circuit court rejected outright
the notion of an "equitable" remedy based on the "sweat of the
brow" theory as contradicting the Feist ruling.
A second conflict arises from allowing certain copyright holders
to protect future works. By restraining people from copying works
that have not yet been created, an injunction allows claimants to
avoid registration altogether. After all, why register a copyright if
future infringers are already enjoined from copying the work?
Such injunctions, in effect, grant a copyright monopoly and elevate
protection of the author over the common good. Also, an injunc-
tion such as CNN sought would have prohibited the copying not
only of copyrighted works, but also would have prohibited the
copying of those works that should have had no copyright protec-
tion. Granting the injunction would have effectively bypassed the
constitutional mandate of originality. No test for originality can
exist for works that have not yet been created. This sort of "future
works injunction" would also grant authors a method of securing
copyright protection for material in the public domain. °7
103. Id.
104. Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1292-93.
105. Id. at 1289.
106. VMS, 940 F.2d at 1481 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
107. Id. The circuit court also examined the propriety of granting injunctive relief
for the infringement of unregistered copyrights in existing works. The circuit court
reminded the parties that a prerequisite to any action in copyright is the registration of the
work. While it is true that under the Copyright Act of 1976 a copyright owner who has
not registered his claim can have a valid cause of action against someone who has in-
fringed his copyright, he cannot enforce his rights in the courts until he has registered.
Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 411(a)(1988)). The court also reviewed § 411(b), which deals with
the special situation presented by works that are transmitted live at the same time they
are fixed in a tangible form for the first time. id. at 1482 (citing 17 U.S.C. §
411(b)(1988)).
However, the court came to the conclusion that such rights could only be enforced
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The circuit court reviewed CNN's claims, keeping in mind the
above considerations. Although CNN asserted that access to copies
of its programming could be obtained from its library and other
sources, the court noted that CNN was under no statutory obliga-
tion to keep such a library or to allow access to such resources.0 8
Indeed, a broadcaster is only obligated to "fix" the program at the
time of transmission if copyright protection is sought. Even then,
the broadcaster is not required to retain the fixed copy for any
length of time, unless it is submitted for registration. The broad-
caster could erase the tapes immediately. The court found the
threat of such abuse to be quite real, with the possibility of a mo-
nopolization of information by news broadcasters. It concluded,
"[b]y approving a grant of injunctive relief for infringement of
unregistered, copyrighted transmission programs, we would allow
broadcasters to close the door on public access to their work prod-
uct.'
109
b. The Fair Use Issue
The second issue considered by the Eleventh Circuit was fair
use. The court noted that the "fair use" doctrine was incorporated
into the 1976 Copyright Act"0 in order to counter the nullification
of the publication requirement, which had been the traditional guar-
antor of free access to information."' The court then observed that
regardless of how CNN defined its broadcasting, some portion of
it would always be open to unlicensed recording. This was be-
cause some segments would either fall in the public domain, or
become available for anyone to record, through application of the
fair use section."' Because the injunction sought by CNN would
by injunctive relief when the infringer had been given advance notice of potential in-
fringement. The typical use of this section is by broadcasters enforcing their exclusive
rights in live sports broadcasting. Id.
108. Id. at 1483.
109. Id. at 1484.
110. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988 & Supp. I1 1991).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1484-85. Of course, a finding of fair use depends upon the ability of the
copier to provide a legitimate motive conforming to the fair use section.
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have denied these basic liberties given by the law, the court found
that the fair use doctrine ran counter to the broad injunction pro-
posed by CNN."
The court reiterated the finding of Duncan I that a news broad-
cast is not a copyrightable whole, but is a compilation of many
smaller works." 4  Accordingly, a typical television newscast is
copyrightable in its entirety only as a compilation, and simply
copying a segment is not a violation of that particular copyright.
In order to initiate a copyright action, each and every copyrightable
segment of a newscast would have to be individually registered." 5
The circuit court then reminded the parties of the holding in Miller
v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,1 6 which specifically stated that
"[tlhe originality requirement... remains the touchstone of copy-
right protection today .... 'It is the very premise of copyright
law' .... The distinction is one between creation and discovery:
the first person to find and report a particular fact has not created
the fact; he or she has merely discovered its existence."" 7 The
circuit court continued, reiterating the findings of Feist: "No mat-
ter how original the format... the facts themselves do not become
original through association."" 8
The court concluded that "[s]imply stated, the copyright in a
compilation does not prohibit the copying of pre-existing material
that is in the compilation."" 9 What this means is that a newscast
may contain any number of parts which, on their own, cannot be
copyrighted for various reasons. While the newscast as a whole
113. Id. at 1485.
114. Id. See also Duncan I Appeal, 744 F.2d at 1493.
115. This means that each separate news item is viewed as a separate story, or a
separate motion picture. Thus, if a station wants to copyright an entire newscast, it must
file a registration form for each 30-45 second clip. Obviously, this procedure becomes
much easier if the entire newscast focuses on a single topic. Hence, a half-hour news
special on a single topic, such as Iraqi military strength, may be registered as a single
work.
116. 650 F.2d 1365 (5th Cir. 1981).
117. VMS, 940 F.2d at 1485 (quoting Feist, III S. Ct. at 1289) (citing Miller, 650
F.2d at 1368).
118. Id. at 1486 (quoting Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1289).
119. Id.
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can be copyrighted, these uncopyrightable portions do not obtain
copyright protection simply by being included in a copyrighted
compilation. 120 Hence, the circuit court concluded that the district
court had erred in finding that CNN had a substantial likelihood of
success on the merits and that the relief afforded served the public
interest. The order of injunction was reversed and the case re-
manded.1
21
4. Try and Try Again
The most recent case involving the videotaping of newscasts is
Los Angeles News Service v. Tulle," a Ninth Circuit decision that
came down in August of 1992. Audio Video Reporting Services
("AVRS") was a monitoring and video newsclipping service,"
performing essentially the same function in Los Angeles as Carol
Duncan performed in Atlanta in Duncan I. The plaintiff in this
case, however, was not a television station but rather, Los Angeles
News Service ("LANS"), a freelance video service that sold raw
footage of news events to broadcasters.1 24 The crux of the case
revolved around news footage of an airplane crash and a train
wreck. LANS had filmed these events, registered the copyrights of
the tapes, and then sold the tapes to a Los Angeles broadcaster.
AVRS taped the newscast containing the film segments, and then
sold the videotapes."z LANS sued for copyright infringement.
120. Example: Professor X quotes verbatim a recent Supreme Court decision in his
new compendium of humorous legal writing. Just because the quote appears in a copy-
righted work does not grant Professor X a copyright in the quote itself. It is still in the
public domain, and anyone can use it.
121. VMS, 940 F.2d at 1486. The decision was later vacated. CNN v. Video Moni-
toring Servs. of Am., Inc., 949 F.2d 378 (11th Cir. 1991). The appeal of the preliminary
injunction was reheard en bane, on Feb. 11, 1992. However, by this time, the case below
had been decided, and the district court granted CNN a permanent injunction against
VMS. The Eleventh Circuit, s itting en banc, found that there was no reason to overturn
the decision, as the matter before it dealt only with a preliminary injunction, so VMS's
appeal of the permanent injunction was (wrongly) denied. CNN v. Video Monitoring
Servs. of Am., Inc., 959 F.2d 188 (11th Cir. 1992).
122. 973 F.2d 791 (9th Cir. 1992) [hereinafter LANS].
123. Id. at 792.
124. Id.
125. Id.
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AVRS relied on the holding in VMS26 to support its claim that
LANS's footage did not possess enough originality to be copyright-
ed. The Ninth Circuit, however, disagreed and found that almost
all photographs and videotapes possess the very low level of origi-
nality required by Feist.127 The circuit court also reprimanded
AVRS for relying on a decision that was vacated and thus had no
value as precedent." The circuit court also distinguished the case
at hand from VMS by recognizing that the issue in VMS was the
blanket copyright of newscasts and not the copyrightability of raw
footage. 129 The distinction is found in the 1976 Act: "The copy-
right in a compilation... extends only to the material contributed
by the author of such work, as distinguished from the preexisting
material employed in the work.... .13 0
LANS is readily distinguishable from the cases cited earlier in
this Note, as LANS had already obtained copyright registration
when it sold the footage to the television station. Also,'the remedy
that the circuit court imposed was not nearly as draconian as that
applied by the district court in VMS. The district court awarded
half the statutory maximum damages, 1' which amounted to
$10,000 for each infringement.' The decision by the circuit court
was aided by LANS's withdrawal of a request for an injunction.
For these reasons, this Note will refer only sparingly to the LANS
case. This Note is concerned not with the copyrightability of spe-
cific news segments, but rather, the overly broad injunctive relief
of the kind approved by the Eleventh Circuit.
126. 940 F.2d 1471 (11th Cir. 1991).
127. LANS, 973 F.2d at 794 n.3. See also supra note 93 and accompanying text
(discussion of Feist).
128. LANS, 973 F.2d at 794 n.4.
129. Id.
130. 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (cited in LANS, 973 F.2d at 794 n.4).
131. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 504 (Supp. 1992) (Berne Convention provision).
132. LANS, 973 F.2d at 792. LANS had originally requested a permanent injunction
against AVRS but later dropped the request from its pleadings. Id. This may have been
motivated by profit (the $20,000 in statutory damages is worth much more than LANS
would have received for any two tapes of news footage in an open market) or (more
likely) the probability that the injunction would have been denied by application of the
then-pending VMS standard (the VMS decision had not yet been vacated when LANS
brought its suit).
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'fT. VARIOUS VIEWS ON COPYRIGHT
The conflict from which the VMS and Duncan I cases seem to
stem is that caused by the relatively new treatment of the First
Amendment. The trend has been to interpret "freedom of speech"
as being equivalent to "freedom to hear speech" or, more appropri-
ately, "freedom to access of information."' 33 The conflict develops
when two very strong theories of copyright protection collide. The
first theory is the property approach, which holds that the primary
goal of copyright law is the protection of property rights.134 The
second view is the regulatory approach, which holds that the prima-
ry goal of copyright is to disseminate information and ideas in an
efficient manner, and that the property rights occurring in copyright
are secondary in nature and importance.135
The conflict arises when one party claims that its First Amend-
ment right to freedom of access to information is impeded by a
second party's exercise of copyright. As was seen in the Duncan
cases, the defendant claims a First Amendment right to copy the
newscasts, despite apparent copyright infringement. This argument
was rejected by the Eleventh Circuit and later that year by the
Supreme Court in Harper & Row Publishers Inc. v. Nation Enter-
prises. Both courts found that First Amendment privileges were
included in the fair use doctrine. One cannot have a First Amend-
ment defense separate from a fair use defense, as fair use encom-
passes any First Amendment argument. Because fair use is a bal-
ancing test, it is helpful to observe how each approach is interpret-
ed. This section will cover briefly the history and basic philoso-
phies of both the proprietary and regulatory approaches, and it will
show why both these approaches fail when they are applied to
news broadcasts.
133. See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-763 (1972). See also Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) ("the Constitution protects the right to receive infor-
mation and ideas"); Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 556, 576 (1980).
134. An excellent example of proprietary interpretation of copyright law is that of
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
135. See generally, Patterson, Free Speech, supra note 23; Zimmerman, supra note
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A. The Proprietary View
Often, copyright is viewed as property. The owner of a copy-
right has the ability to sell a work, while retaining the rights of its
reproduction. These rights are, themselves, subject to sale and
resale. Naturally, one would assume that such an item, if it can be
sold at will, is a part of one's estate and is therefore property.
However, let us step back even further into history to consider why
copyright was developed at all.
1. The English Background
The United States' First Amendment right to freedom of ex-
pression and the law of copyright arose from the same source in
English law.136 An example commonly cited is the English Licens-
ing Act of 1662,'37 made law during the reign of Charles 11. The
Act was a modification of the earlier Star Chamber Decree of
1637, a censorship act passed by Charles J.13' The Licensing Act
was an act "for preventing the frequent abuses in printing seditious,
treasonable, and unlicensed books and pamphlets, and for regulat-
ing of printing and printing presses.' 39 Basically, the Act made it
illegal for anyone to print a book that was not registered with the
Company of Stationers. Of course, the Company of Stationers was
primarily a tool of censorship: no book would be registered if it
did not pass the censors. Requiting all printed materials to be
routed through the Company of Stationers also granted the compa-
ny a monopoly on the printing industry. The Stationers did not
have to register a book if they were not contracted to print it.
140
Almost fifty years later, Parliament came to the conclusion that
the Company of Stationers had a strangle hold on the English print
136. See, e.g., L. Ray Patterson, The Statute of Anne: Copyright Misconstrued, 3
HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 223 (1966); Zimmerman, supra note 15, at 171.
137. 13 & 14 Car. 2 c. 33, explained in 6 WLLAM S. HOLDSVORTH, A HISTORY
OF ENGLISH LAW 372 (1927).
138. 6 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 137, at 368-69, 372.
139. 14 Car. If. c. 33, reprinted in 6 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 137, at 372.
140. Zimmerman, supra note 15, at 174-75.
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industry. In 1709, the Statute of Anne was enacted.' 4 1 It was basi-
cally the same law as the Licensing Act, but it limited the period
of copyright registration and allowed anyone to seek copyright.
Unlike the Licensing Act, which grafited copyright registration in
perpetuity, the Statute of Anne limited the term to fourteen years. 42
Also, allowing anyone to copyright material was in direct contrast
to the Licensing Act, which required that only the original publish-
er of material could do so.14 By breaking the hold of the Statio-
ners over the printing industry, the Crown also weakened its own
influence. The burden of censorship was greatly eased.
2. Copyright as Property in the United States
Later United States court decisions recognized additional au-
thors' rights as creators of their own works, thus reinforcing the
proprietary nature of copyright law. Before these cases, authors'
rights had received little attention because the works were generally
considered to be owned in their entirety by the publisher, not the
author.
The U.S. Supreme Court recognized in Stephens v. Cady'44 that
"[tihe copy-right is an exclusive right to the multiplication of the
copies, for the benefit of the author or his assigns .... It is an
incorporeal right to print and publish .... 145 In this sense, the
Supreme Court recognized that every copyrighted work consists of
two distinct parts: the actual, tangible work, and the right to repro-
duce it. The rights do not have to co-exist.
Likewise, in the landmark copyright case of Wheaton v. Pe-
ters,146 the Supreme Court held that an author had a definite propri-
etary interest in his work. More specifically, an author had a com-
mon law proprietary right in his work from the time of its creation.
141. 6 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 137, at 377.
142. 15 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 137, at 37.
143. Zimmerman, supra note 15, at 175-76.
144. 55 U.S.(12 How.) 528 (1852) (owner of printing plates sued owner of copyright
to allow publishing of map).
145. Id. at 530.
146. 33 U.S.(8 Pet.) 591 (1834).
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However, once the work was published, the author had to rely
solely on federal copyright law. 47
Courts have recognized the proprietary nature of copyright in
two of the cases discussed earlier in this Note. 148 In the Betamax
case, Justice Blackmun's dissent exemplified the typical approach
to copyright as property. The Justice opined that home taping of
copyrighted works, though not immediately harmful to the televi-
sion industry, damages the future market for a studio's produc-
tions.149 He rejected the "fair use" approach, discussed later, stat-
ing that "[tihere is no indication that the fair use doctrine has any
application for purely personal consumption ... . ,,5 0
The Duncan I Appeal court also adopted a proprietary view of
copyright. By rejecting Ms. Duncan's claims of fair use and First
Amendment rights, the court gave the unspoken word that WXLA-
TV had property rights in the broadcasts that should be protected
from intruders, despite other considerations.
B. The Regulatory Approach
While many think that copyright is a fQrm of property to be
bartered and sold, another school of thought believes that property
rights are merely the by-product of government regulation. Under
the regulation approach, a property interest in copyright is merely
an expedient form of regulation. To determine which view is cor-
rect, we must look to the basis of United States copyright law,
found in the Constitution. The power to give copyright protection
lies in Article 1, section 8, clause 8: "The Congress shall have
147. Id. at 665. The law was subsequently amended in 1976 to provide for federal
protection before and after registration, effectively nullifying all common law causes of
action in copyright. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (only requirements for protection are that work is
original and fixed).
148. See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984); supra note
32 and accompanying text; see also P.acific & S. Co. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490 (11th Cir.
1984); supra note 60 and accompanying text.
149. Sony, 464 U.S. at 481-86.
150. Id. at 495.
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Power... [t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."' 51 Quite clear-
ly, from the wording of the clause, protection is not granted to
authors because of a moral right in their works, but rather, "[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts." Authors'
rights are secondary to the public's right to dissemination of infor-
mation and ideas.
The view of copyright as a regulatory concept is perhaps best
advanced by the Supreme Court decisions in the Betamax case and
Feist.152 In the Betamax case, the Supreme Court held that the
main purpose of copyright was not to protect an owner's interest
in a work, but rather, to promote public access to information." 3
The Court determined that home recording of a television program
for viewing at a later date furthered.public access to information.
As Justice Stevens stated -for the majority, copyright is a "limited
monopoly that should be granted to authors or to inventors in order
to give the pubic appropriate access to their work product."'154 He
also noted that copyright law "has never accorded the copyright
owner complete control over all possible uses of his work."'5 5
Finally, the Court recggnized "the public interest in making televi-
sion broadcasting more available."'156 The Court found that the
benefits for such "time-shifting" through use of video tape ma-
chines greatly outweighed the detrimental effects on the broadcast-
ing companies.157 Thus, video home systems were declared legal.
In Feist, the Supreme Court again upheld the regulatory ap-
proach to copyright by rejecting the "sweat of the brow" argu-
ment.'5 The plaintiff had claimed that an author of a work had a
certain moral right to it, even if it lacked originality, simply be-
151. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, dl. 8.
152. Sony, 464 U.S. 417; Feist, 111 S. Ct. 1282.
153. 464 U.S. at 429.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 432.
156. Id. at 454.
157. Id.
158. 111 S. Ct. at 1291.
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cause of the time and effort he put into it. This assertion was re-
jected by the Court, which stated that originality was the touch-
stone of copyright law, not ownership in a work, regardless of how
much labor was expended.' 59
Completely differentiating between the two approaches, howev-
er, is not entirely proper. In reality, the proprietary theory and the
regulatory theory are simply at opposite ends of the copyright spec-
trum. The two approaches can be differentiated only in their most
extreme forms. For example, suppose the court in VMS had taken
an extreme proprietary approach. The court would probably have
found that CNN had absolute control over its own copyrighted
programming. Therefore, other unlicensed copying of the broad-
casts would be treated as infringement.
At the other end of the spectrum, a court may take an extreme
regulatory approach. The court could find that CNN simply per-
forms a necessary public service by broadcasting compiled factual
information and that none of its work is copyrightable. Because
the purpose of copyright is to disseminate information, and news
is often the purest form of such dissemination, CNN would be left
with no recourse.
C. Balancing Property and Regulation: Fair Use
Reality is usually not so cut-and-dried. Most cases seem to fall
somewhere between property and regulation analysis, and the judi-
cial system is required to balance the scales. Usually, an equitable
arrangement is reached to accommodate both views. This equitable
balancing act has been given the force of law, and it is known as
the "fair use doctrine."
In early United States copyright law, the dividing line between
proprietary rights and general copyright was the simple act of pub-
lication. As discussed previously,16 an author had absolute proper-
ty rights until publication of the work. Before publication, the
author was able to rely on common law for protection of his inter-
159. Id. at 1294-95.
160. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
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ests. After publication, only federal copyright law was applica-
ble. 6 While works remained in a basic written form, this was a
simple and fairly just solution. However, with the advent of new
technologies, the distinction between what was and what was not
"publication" became nebulous.
Publication is defined in the Copyright Act as:
[Tihe distribution of copies or phonorecords of a work to
the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rent-
al, lease, or lending. The offering to distribute copies or
phonorecords to a group of persons for purposes of further
distribution, public performance, or public display, consti-
tutes publication. A public performance or display of a
work does not of itself constitute publication. 62
The clear distinction between a public performance and publication
insures against fraudulent infringement claims.' 63
A conflict plainly arose with the advent of live broadcast televi-
sion. Some televised programs more than fulfilled the originality
requirements of copyrights. The programs, however, were being
distributed to the public (publication) for free-that is, without sale,
transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending, as required by
the Act. This obviously raises the question of copyrightability
under the Copyright Act. Changing the definition of publication
would create more problems than it would solve. Rather than cre-
ate a whole new body of legislation for the new medium, Congress
chose to rework the copyright law. 64 As a result, the requirement
of publication for copyright was dropped. In its place, Congress
substituted the ability to copyright all works, published or unpub-
lished. 65 This had the effect of doing away with the body of com-
mon law dealing with proprietary interest in a work and replacing
161. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 665 (1834).
162. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988 & Supp. H 1991).
163. Example: "Why, I performed that play three years ago in the Berkshires!"
"Prove it!". "I can't, I didn't write it down."
164. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 18, at 51, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
5664.
165. H.R. REP No. 1476, supra note 18, at 52, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
5665.
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it with copyright law. As stated in VMS, now authors may rely on
federal copyright protection for all their works, published or unpub-
lished. 66 However, before an action may be brought in court, the
work must be "fixed in a tangible form" and duly registered with
the Office of Copyright.'
This seemed well and good. However, in solving one very
large problem, Congress replaced it with a more insidious one.
Congress erased the "bright line" that the publication requirement
afforded-the line that determined whose rights were the greater,
those of the public or of the author. In its place was left a murky
body of equitable law, now fashioned "the fair use doctrine."
Fair use of copyrighted materials has been recognized as a
defense to copyright infringement claims since 1841.'68 It grew in
power over the years and became an important part of the common
law. This doctrine was finally codified as § 107 in the Copyright
Act of 1976, consisting of a four part test to determine fair use.169
The fair use section had a strong judicial background, even
before its inclusion into the 1976 Act. Courts had found fair use
in activities such as:
quotation of excerpts in a review or criticism for purposes
of illustration or comment; quotation of short passages in a
scholarly or technical work, for illustration or clarification
of the author's observations; use in a parody of some of the
content of the work parodied; summary of an address or
article, with brief quotations, in a news report; reproduction
by a library of a portion of a work to replace part of a dam-
aged copy; reproduction by a teacher or student of a small
part of a work to illustrate a lesson; reproduction of a work
in legislative or judicial proceedings or reports; incidental
and fortuitous reproduction, in a newsreel or broadcast, of
166. VMS, 940 F.2d 1471, 1478.
167. Id. at 1482.
168. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (in finding that defendant
had infringed copyright of George Washington's biography, court first questioned whether
such use was justified).
169. See supra note 53.
1993]
512 FORDHAM ENT., MEDIA & INTELL. PROP. L.F.
a work located in the scene of an event being reported.170
However, even with the explicit examples, the fair use doctrine
has been, and remains for the most part, an equitable rule, with the
basic guidelines enumerated in § 107 of the Copyright Act of 1976.
Section 107 was intended simply to state the then-current applica-
tion of the fair use doctrine, not to change, narrow or enlarge it in
any way- 1 In effect, Congress gave the courts free reign to define
fair use. The law was written to reflect the state of judicial doc-
trine of 1976 but was expressly created in order not to limit subse-
quent interpretations. 72 Rather, it was intended to provide basic
guidelines to reflect the changing nature of copyright law.173
IV. THE NEED FOR A NEW APPROACH
What follows is a series of issues relevant to television news-
casts that are not satisfactorily resolved by application of the fair
use doctrine, the proprietary view, or the regulatory view. This
Note proposes that other factors need to be considered when deter-
mining the copyrightability of newscasts, such as proper ownership
of a videotaped copy, the availability of copying to the public as
a whole, and a consideration of traditional economic policies of the
United States. This Note will emphasize the need for a more com-
prehensive approach to newscast copyright, and will propose an
amendment to the relevant legislation.
A. Who Owns the Videotape?
1. Clipping Services Are Agents, Not Producers
In VMS, the court summarily rejected the view that VMS was
170. H.R. REP No. 1476, supra note 18, at 65, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
5678-79.
171. Id. at 66, 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5680.
172. Id.
173. Id.
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able to rely on the exception to copyright law found in 17 U.S.C.
§ 109. Section 109 states that the rightful owner of a copy may do
anything with it, including renting, lending, or selling it. 74 This
section is often used by "news clipping" companies, which clip
articles from newspapers and then sell them to clients. The court
found that because VMS, unlike a purchaser of a newspaper, did
not pay for its copy, it was not technically the owner. This is a
mere technicality, one which could easily be ignored.
Since the Betamax case, individuals have been given the right
to record broadcasts for home use. Anyone is allowed to record,
including the clients of VMS. The defendant in LANS relied on the
Betamax case to justify recording of newscasts. The Ninth Circuit
drew a clear distinction between recording newscasts for later
viewing ("time shifting") and recording newscasts for resale. 75
AVRS wrongly relied on its own ability to record off the air. In-
stead, it should have placed more emphasis on its clients' ability to
make the recordings. The argument can be made that news moni-
toring services are not really selling clips of newscasts but are in-
stead performing a service for their clients. If the clients video-
taped the newscasts themselves, for personal use, there would be
no infringement. The broadcaster could not be involved in this
transaction. It seems that it would serve the public interest if such
news clipping companies were treated as agents of their clients and
not independent operators.
2. Tapes of News Broadcasts Are in the Public Domain
The argument that v'ideo clipping services do not own the taped
174. The relevant section reads as follows: "(a) Notwithstanding the provisions of
section 106(3), the owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this
title, or any person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the authority of the
copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or
phonorecord." 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1988). Section 106(3) states that "[s]ubject to sec-
tions 107 through 118, the owner of a copyright under this title has the exclusive rights
to do and to authorize any of the following. . . . (3) to distribute copies or phonorecords
of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental,
lease, or lending;...." 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
175. LANS, 973 F.2d at 797.
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programs, and therefore cannot sell the tapes, is without merit.
Recall the example of the newspaper: the contention is not that the
clipping service owns the right to a particular article, but rather to
the personal copy of a particular article. Section 106 of the Copy-
right Act prohibits the copying of copyrighted materials, but § 109
allows the sale of legally copied materials. Since videotaping is
legal, it follows that the sale of these legally made tapes should
also be legal. This view, however, was expressly rejected by the
LANS court.176
Tapes can be made of two types of television transmissions:
aerial (transmitted via antenna) and cable. This Note shall first
address aerial transmissions, which are free of charge. Take the
example of a free news circular appearing in the mailbox. The
circular has no subscription price; it is funded entirely by advertis-
ers. Or, similarly, a newspaper appears on the doorstep, even
though the occupant has no subscription. It is a free paper, entic-
ing the reader to purchase a subscription. Does this circular or
paper remain the property of the publisher? Or is it treated as a
gift, becoming the receiver's property? The probability is that this
newspaper would becdme the property of the individual, despite the
fact that the individual has paid nothing for it.177
The subscriber would then have the right to clip articles from
this paper and sell them, under § 109 of the Copyright Act.178
True, the law does not authorize a person to reproduce the copy-
righted item, but it does allow the person to sell the item itself.
This Note is not concerned with making copies of videotapes. The
concern is with what the owner may do with a particular, lawfully
made videotape.179 Why should the provisions of § 109 not apply
176. Id.
177. "[It is arguable that] a recipient has no obligations if he receives the goods or
services under circumstances reasonably inducing his honest belief that they were intended
as a gift and uses them before he learns otherwise." Note, Unsolicited Merchandise:
State and Federal Remedies for a Consumer Problem, 1970 DuKH L.J. 991, 996. Unor-
dered goods received in the mail may be treated as gifts, and a recipient may do with
them as he pleases. Postal Reorganization Act of 1970, 39 U.S.C. § 3009(b) (1988).
178. See supra note 174.
179. The Betamax Court declined to rule on the legality or illegality of certain
recordings, as such a ruling could only result from lawsuits by other individual copyright
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to television news? The receiver of the news generally cannot, and
does not, pay for it. Does the broadcast, if recorded, remain the
property of the station even though it was transmitted for free to
thousands of people? Does the federal government own the broad-
cast? The government owns the airwaves on which the broadcast
is transmitted. Do a station's property rights cease to exist when
such property is flung towards space?18 It would seem that a re-
ceiver, by such unsolicited reception, becomes, at least for that
single tape, the legal owner.
The matter in question is greatly simplified with respect to pay
TV operators.' Unlike aerial broadcasts, one must pay to receive
CNN. It is impossible to legally receive it in any other fashion
without paying. While CNN is usually considered a basic cable
service, at least part of a cable subscription rate will go to fund
CNN programming. 182 CNN has recently started to scramble its
satellite signal, so those people with satellite dishes must now pay
CNN a monthly service charge for a decoder. Doesn't this grant
at least some sort of property right in the broadcast for those re-
ceiving it? Like a newspaper, CNN programming must be pur-
chased through subscription.
Some may argue that there is a distinct difference between
paying for the right to receive news and paying for copy of the
holders. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 434. In LANS, the circuit court stated that though a
viewer may be invited to "time shift' a public broadcast, the viewer is not invited to sell
copies of the program. LANS, 973 F.2d at 798 n.7. However, the court ignored the
singular nature of newscasts and their general inability of repetition. Thus, time shifting
becomes more crucial to the viewing of a newscast, and it should then be given wider
latitude when determining its legality.
180. It is generally conceded that the government has no property right in broadcasts
by way of the frequency-ownership theory. See generally Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); Nancy Nord, Comment, Red Lion Broadcasting Co., Inc. v.
FCC-Extension of the Fairness Doctrine to Include Right ofAccess to the Press, 15 S.D.
L. REV. 172 (1970).
181. The Betamax Court specifically declined to review the issue of videotaping
cable television transmission. See Sony v. Universal, 464 U.S. at 458 n.2 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
182. CNN charges cable systems about 37 cents per subscriber if the cable operator
carries no other Turner Broadcasting programming. The rate decreases as more Turner.
programming is carried by the operator. Melissa Turner, CNN to Raise Rates Cable
Systems Pay, ATLANTA . & CONST., July 2, 1991, at C7.
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news under § 109. However, such an argument would be based
solely on technical definitions of publication and transmission. This
kind of argument would hearken back to the early days of copy-
right enforcement and the creation of highly artificial and arbitrary
categories of what is, and what is not, a copy."8 3 It is the view of
this Note that if a news service is paid for, be it by cable transmis-
sion or by the mails, a property right accrues.
3. Fixation Is Not a Valid Method of Defining Newscast
Copyright
Perhaps the requirement of fixation is not a useful method of
defining copyrightability for newscasts after all. At the very least,
it is incomplete. The correct definition of copyrightable materials
of a factual nature is that copyrightability of material does not
depend on how a form may be fixed, but rather, the form by which
the material is, distributed to the public. Thus, it is not the act of
taping a news broadcast that should be protected, but rather the act
of transmitting a news broadcast. The "copy" of copyright in a
news broadcast should refer not to copying the fixed form, but
rather copying the method by which it reaches the public-a "re-
broadcast right." Section 111 of the 1976 Act permits the rebroad-
cast of certain transmissions, provided, among other restrictions,
that the rebroadcaster not change the original transmission.18 4 The
design of § 111 preserves the market of the original broadcaster,
while furthering the Copyright Act's goal of dissemination of infor-
mation. It is the view of this Note that § 111 of the 1976 Act pro-
vides sufficient protection to news broadcasters, and that further
copyright protection for news broadcasts in the form of injunctive
relief from videotaping is not required.
Arguments in this field seem based on semantics bordering on
the metaphysical plane. According to the Supreme Court's inter-
pretation of the First Amendment, all citizens have the civil right
to receive information. 85 By definition, a civil right is something
183. See White-Smith Music Publishing Co., 209 U.S. 1.
184. 17 U.S.C. §§ 111(a)(3) & (b)(3) (1988 & Supp. I1 1991).
185. See supra note 133, and accompanying text.
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to which every person is entitled. Rights have little or no substan-
tive value.186 However, one must pay for certain forms of informa-
tion (newspapers, cable television news), and therefore a value is
assigned to this right. Thus, one person may pay for a newspaper
subscription, while another might invest in cable television. The
courts, however, for purposes of property, treat the two forms as
thoroughly dissimilar. How can the news that certain subscribers
receive be altogether different from that which others receive, some
falling within the ambit of § 109, while some does not? The argu-
ment would have to be that television news is not really news at
all, but rather, entertainment, thus falling outside the scope of §
109. It is doubtful that broadcasters will espouse this view. News
is news is news. The fact that one form is received aurally as well
as visually, while one is received strictly visually, should not make
a difference.
B. A Rational Economic Approach
1. Copyright Law Must Reflect Economic Reality
The Chicago school, led by Judge Posner, advocates the view
that society is governed by "rational maximizers."'187 These actors
will take the route that is the cheapest and most feasible. This
view of the law shuns the notion of legal vs. illegal acts; it simply
holds that people respond to incentives, some more attractive than
others.' 8 Thus, all people can be considered amoral in the eyes of
the law.'89 What distinguishes criminals from the rest of society is
that criminals are more willing to risk the consequences to obtain
an economic gain.'90
To deter crimes under this rationale, society must make the
price for disobeying the law very high. Following this economic
view, if the award of damages is outweighed by legal costs, it is
not economically feasible to bring suit. However, this allows peo-
186. See, e.g., Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978) (interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
187. See RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 3 (3d ed. 1986).
188. Id. at 4.
189. Id. at 239.
190. Id. at 240.
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pie to get away with crimes. The government has two options.
One, do away with the law to reflect the economic reality of the
situation, or two, increase- the penalty for breaking the law to make
the law worthwhile to enforce.19' As Judge Posner stated:
the economist may be able to show that the means by
which society has attempted to attain [the goal of limiting
theft] are inefficient-that society could obtain more pre-
vention, at lower cost, by using different methods. If the
more efficient methods did not impair any other values,
they would be socially desirable. . .. 192
The Ninth Circuit has followed the second path. Instead of
formulating injunctions designed to keep the offender from break-
ing the law, the penalty imposed on AVRS will probably have the
effect of making the monitoring service more cautious, and thus
achieving the same end with a minimum of court interference.
Another lesson to be learned from LANS is that a tangible copy-
right is more powerful than a more limited compilation copyright.
While CNN received what it asked for in VMS and Duncan I Ap-
peal, the same effect could have been had by applying the more
stringent and less complicated approach of the Ninth Circuit in
LANS.
2. Newscasts Have Little Long-Term Value
Once a news broadcast has been transmitted, the broadcast
becomes relatively worthless to the station. In the case of the aeri-
al broadcasters, advertising sales generate most of the profits de-
rived from news reports. Advertising rates are, in turn, governed
by market share. Market share is determined by the number of
people watching a show at any particular time, relative to total
viewers at that time. News is by nature time-limited, and so re-
broadcasts are generally of little worth because they draw few
viewers. Newscasts compete for market share by presenting their
news in an appealing format that will capture a loyal audience.
191. Id. at 242-44.
192. Id. at 21.
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Hence, the primary reason for copyrighting newscasts by broadcast-
ers would seem to be to prevent competing stations from rebroad-
casting current news from the station with the best coverage of a
particular news item, thus misappropriating a portion of the market
share.
Of coirse, in the real world there are exceptions to this perfect
economic view. However, there are also many caveats with these
exceptions. A common exception is that some stations rebroadcast
the news of others. The caveat is that generally, the two stations
are not competing for market share. CNN, for example, often
makes news stories available to local broadcasters." 3 First, the
local broadcaster is often not affiliated with a network (hence its
need for more comprehensive programming), confining any possi-
ble competition to a small geographical area. Second, the local
broadcaster is not in competition with CNN. Individuals who do
not have cable TV (or a satellite dish with decoder) cannot receive
CNN; therefore there is no competition. Conversely, if an individ-
ual does have cable TV, CNN assumes that one will watch CNN
and get the news "straight from the horse's mouth." '194 Third, CNN
sells the right of rebroadcast to the local stations. Ted Turner,
owner of CNN, does not have First Amendment freedom of access
argument foremost on his mind. (Else he would give everyone free
cable TV so everyone could get CNN.) He is in the business for
a profit. Giving away resources does not a profit make.
This Note declines to deal with the situation that appeared in
AVRS. While broadcasters generally have very little by way of a
resale market, the markets of AVRS and LANS had substantial
overlap. 195 While opening the market to monitoring services would
not substantially impair the business .of broadcasters, it could defi-
nitely harm the business of footage providers, such as LANS.
However, the Ninth Circuit did not delve into relevant markets,
193. CNN has a daily news-feed service that supplies stories to 265 television sta-
tions. Richard Zoglin, Inside the World of CNN, TIME, Jan. 6, 1992, at 28.
194. A survey of 215 network affiliate stations revealed that most station managers
ranked CNN second only to local broadcast competition as a threat to their local news
ratings. Gerald Jaffe & David Bivins, Affiliate Angst, MEDIA WK., Sept. 2, 1991, at 16.
195. LANS, 973 F.2d at 799.
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which was a mistake. It may be the case that all of LANS's reve-
nues were derived from sales to television stations, and the sales by
AVRS did not impair LANS's market value at all. The circuit
court only hypothesized that some AVRS customers might purchase
instead from LANS.'9 6
3. All News Is Public Interest by Nature
As stated before, news being what it is, the usefulness of such
broadcasts is severely limited by time. People do not want to
watch last week's news. Copyright law should be rewritten to
reflect this. In fact, it seems to be the case that newscasts should
not be copyrighted at all. Unlike most shows, they are not enter-
tainment, simply the production of fact. While different stations
may have different methods of providing news, the basic nature of
any newscast is factual. It seems far too complicated, even hypo-
critical, to allow every newscast to be copyrighted, and yet still
require individual segments to be individually copyrighted in order
to gain copyright protection. Professor Nimmer has developed the
theory that in some cases fact and expression of that fact become
so inseparable, and so infused with the public interest, that both are
in the public domain and are exempt from copyright. He gives as
a possible example the Zapruder film of President Kennedy's assas-
sination." Relatively recently, the Supreme Court has decided
several cases determining that the First Amendment guarantees a
freedom of access to information.'98 Television and print news is
information, albeit in a slightly digested form. By its very nature,
if news broidcasts did not arouse public interest, they would be of
little use to the broadcaster, or anyone else for that matter. Like-
wise, news is intertwined with its presentation. A fact should not
become copyrightable through its mere association with a copy-
rightable performance. 199
196. Id. (relying on the finding in Duncan IAppeaO. See supra note 60 and accom-
panying text.
197. 1 MELVILLs B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §
1.10[C][2], at 1-86 (1992).
198. See supra note 133.
199. Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1289.
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The idea that all news is in the public interest is not new.
Senator Orin Hatch has perennially sponsored a bilI2° to the Senate
that would include newscasts in the fair use exceptions of § 107.2°0
While such an exception would do away with the problem of over-
ly broad injunctions, such as those imposed by the Eleventh Cir-
cuit, it would also endanger the rights of independent news gather-
ers, such as LANS. It could be argued that the fourth test embod-
ied in § 107-that which examines the effect of the use on the
market value of the copyrighted work-would protect such servic-
es.2m However, such a change in the law would manifestly require
ignoring the first test, which determines the "commercial nature of
the work."20 3 While the monitoring services may be performing an
important function, the commercial nature of their business has
always been the catch. To allow profits from fair use is to corrupt
one of the purposes of the fair use clause. The "commercial na-
ture" test has traditionally been the strongest of the fair use deter-
minations, 2' and to ignore it in favor of the "effect on the market'
test is to ignore an entire body of well-thought-out case law. Sena-
tor Hatch's approach also ignores the plight of independent news
gathering companies, such as LANS, whose income is not derived
from broadcasting and advertising, but rather from the licensing of
copyrighted material. The fair use exception he proposes would
have the effect of telling the news gatherers that they are perform-
ing an essential function, but that they should not expect to be
paid, as their product is in the public interest.
4. News Broadcasts Should Not Be Copyrighted
A simple method to deal with the problem is to place news
broadcasts outside of copyright law entirely. Instead, each news
200. 139 CONG. REC. S422 (daily ed. Jan. 5, 1993) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
201. S. 23, 103d Cong., Ist Sess. (1993). The bill states "[tihat section 107 of title
17, United States Code, is amended by inserting 'or monitoring news reporting program-
ming' after 'news reporting.'"
202. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988 & Supp. HI 1991). See supra note 53.
203. Id.
204. See generally Duncan I Appeal, supra part II.B.2; VMS, supra part H.B.3;
Betamax, supra part H.A.
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broadcast, in its entirety, would be issued a "rebroadcast" license,
based in the rebroadcasts rights found in 17 U.S.C. § 111, which
would give stations copyright over the rebroadcast of the news
program for a limited time, but no rights at all over any other uses,
such as resale of tapes or sale of synopses of programs.20 5 Of
course, stations may claim that they offer just such tapes for sale,
and that allowing others to record the newscasts would be an in-
fringement of rights. However, allowing others to make copies
would stimulate the market, having the effect of increasing quality
and driving down prices. Additionally, the broadcaster, as the
originator of the transmissions, should be able to produce higher
quality tapes at lower prices, thus obtaining a lion's share of the
market in any case. As it stands now, the broadcasters have the
ability to record and sell copies of news broadcasts at a fair price.
Since they have not done so, market forces-Adam Smith's "invisi-
ble hand"--have created fairly priced competitors.
CONCLUSION
This Note has shown that news broadcasts cannot be adequately
evaluated on the copyright spectrum through either proprietary or
regulatory forms of analysis. The fair use doctrine, while being the
method of analysis mandated by Congress, ignores basic economic
sense. The current fair use doctrine, as applied to news broadcasts,
is far too narrow in scope, and results in economically driven "law
breaking" and economically inefficient "law enforcement." The
solution for the problem is to take news broadcasts out of the realm
of copyright entirely, creating instead a separate "rebroadcast righe'
for factual works of a time-limited nature. Such a right would
allow the taping of newscasts, but protect the source of broadcast-
ers' incomes, i.e., the advertising revenues from the original broad-
205. Professor Nimmer suggests a similar scheme involving compulsory licensing
for news photographs in which the idea and the expression are inseparable. 1 NMMER
§ 1.10[C][2], at 1-88. This approach was also suggested as a possible remedy by the
defendant in LANS. LANS, 973 F.2d at 796. However, no court has yet adopted this
approach. Id. at 796 n.5.
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cast. However, it is important to note that while such a right
would remove news broadcasts from the realm of copyright, inde-
pendent news gathering organizations would still have the right to
collect and copyright news footage, and these rights could still be
individually enforced.
The problem, however, is that the courts alone cannot imple-
ment such a rule. The change proposed by this Note requires Con-
gressional action. In the meantime, courts should apply the form
of analysis that would most provoke Congress into acting, namely,
the economic approach. Other forms of analysis would provide
temporarily satisfying solutions but would only give the illusion of
a fair and justly operating law. All this time, small economic ac-
tors would be crushed underfoot and consumed by big business.
Using an economic analysis, as shown above in this Note,
would support the position of the small economic actor while caus-
ing the news broadcasters little or no damage. However, such an
application by the courts would surely infuriate and outrage the
news broadcasters. It is the broadcasters (not the fledgling
newsclipping industry) who have power and money enough to
influence Congress and effect a change. Congress must revise the
Copyright Act to exclude news broadcasts. Broadcasters' rights in
their news programs can be protected much more efficiently, and
the right to access of information advanced more forcefully, if a
simple "re-broadcast right" is substituted for the vague and inade-
quate copyright law.
Michael W. Baird
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